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ABSTRACT: The question of emotion in argumentation has received considerable attention in recent
years. But there is a tension between the traditional normative role of informal logic, and the
inclusion of emotion which is viewed as notoriously unstable. Here I argue that that, a] there is
always emotion in an argument; b] that the presence of emotion is a good thing; and c] that we can
and ought model and teach the use of emotion in Argumentation Theory.
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The concepts of ‘‘cognition’’ and ‘‘emotion’’ are, after all, simply
abstractions for two aspects of one brain in the service of action.
(Storbeck & Clore, 2007, p. 3)

1. INTRODUCTION
This essay will focus on a question: What is it about emotions that we find so
frightening? Why do we tremble at the thought of feelings? Why is “being emotional”
something to avoid, and inimical to “clear-thinking”? Warranted or not, this view is
old, as witness Shakespeare, “Give me that man that is not passion’s slave, and I will
wear him in my heart’s core” (Hamlet, Act III, [ODQ] 1955)And, Pope adds, “The
ruling passion, be what it will, the ruling passion conquers reason still,” To Lord
Bathurst (ODQ). Burke is more specific in, On the sublime and the Beautiful: “No
passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear”
(ODQ). More recently, the well known philosopher, Mr. Spock of the Starship
Enterprise, states, “May I say that I have not enjoyed serving under Humans. I find
their illogic and foolish emotions a constant irritant” (Star Trek, 1966).
While the Burke quote refers to a negative emotion, it is worth noting that
the others do not. This raises the question of whether or not positive emotions are
also to be feared. Can there be too much pleasure? An overabundance of love or joy?
I want to suggest that our views of emotion do include the caution of too much of
any emotion, not just the negative ones. Thus, one can be “blinded by love,” and
“blissfully ignorant,” and so on. It strikes me that the key to all this is a question of
control, i.e., of self-control. We have the idea that we can control our thoughts, but
not our emotions, and this makes emotions more frightening than our allegedly pure
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cognitive processes. Elster points out that some emotions can occur out of our
control (1999, pp. 28-29), and cites Montaigne as suggesting that anger can
overcome us before we realize it. In addition, emotions are often involuntary, which
is another way of our being out of control.
There are a number of issues at play here, and I would like to raise several
with the purpose of understanding our approach to emotions. These issues concern
the question of control and why we have no fear of losing cognitive control; how
emotion is essential to decision-making and choice; and, finally, how the
emotion/reason dichotomy mirrors and supports a feminine/masculine division
that is, at its heart, patriarchal.
2. A QUESTION OF CONTROL
I want to say first that we do sometimes, most or all of us, lose control or, perhaps,
come close to that. I know that I certainly do. We may be overcome by emotion and,
occasionally, act in ways that we would otherwise not or would later regret, as a
result of our actions. The degree, frequency, and vehemence with which this
happens will vary greatly from person to person, and from culture to culture. But
anger, sadness, love, among other feelings, can result in a short circuiting of our
usual self-censorship and control. This view resonates but is, I suggest, simplistic in
a number of ways that are worth examining.
The first problem with blaming emotions for our outbursts, is that virtually
all of them are based to one degree or another on beliefs that are a result of a
straightforward cognitive process. Carl becomes enraged because he believes that
Alex broke his guitar out of carelessness. David becomes wracked with sobs and
flooded with tears because he believes that his dog has been killed. Susan commits
herself to buying a house she cannot possibly afford because Beth has agreed to
marry her. All these reactions, which we might say are emotionally driven, rely on
the acceptance of certain beliefs without which they would not occur in the first
place. David’s belief concerning the demise of his pet may be completely rational,
relying on evidence and other perfectly straightforward information. Susan’s joy at
Beth’s acceptance of her marriage proposal is absolutely correct – Beth did, indeed,
accept. Her overwhelming happiness and her desire to make Beth happy by
providing her with the house of her dreams leads Susan to throw caution to the
wind. Each of these incidents involving a loss of control requires a cognitive trigger,
a grounding without which they would not occur. Someone who, without any reason
at all, becomes wildly enraged has a mental defect, just as someone who is
desperately sad without reason does as well, viz., clinical depression.
It is important that while we blame emotions, being over-emotional is but
one way of losing control. A hyper-rationality can also lead to actions that dismay, if
not the actor, then the observers. It is widely accepted that the Nazi Final Solution
was a highly organized and rational undertaking, in at least one sense of the word.
In addition, a multitude of highly intelligent and very rational people believe
statements such as, {P  (Q  P)}, which is a consequence of logical thinking, and the
explanation of which requires much mind bending and convoluted rationales. There
are also extreme cases analogous to depression and psychotic rage, namely, various
2
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forms of autism where emotions are not recognized, leading the afflicted into
actions and situations not to be recommended. As Damasio points out, sociopaths
who steal, rape and lie are, “…the very picture of the cool head we were told to keep
in order to do the right thing” (Damasio, 1994, p. 178).
It is also worth noting that the kind of reasoning promulgated and honoured
in Critical Thinking books and classes, is highly unemotional. We abstract from the
context in order to isolate the premisses and conclusions, and model them in a
linear fashion. This non-emotional, literal way of proceeding is one of Barbara
O’Keefe’s method design logics, viz., the expressive MDL, which is considered the
most unsophisticated method of communication as compared to the conventional
MDL and the rhetorical MDL (O'Keefe, 1988). In other words, in the real world,
ignoring emotion puts one at a disadvantage.
Notice that we tend to place the extremes of over emotionality and hyperrationality in the category of mental illness, (but I do not include informal logicians
in that category.) So the question becomes, for those us who behave typically, is
there a separation between emotion and reason? If we are not “out of control,” are
we always aware of the influences of each? Does not being out of control mean that
we are in control?
I suggest not, and there is evidence to support this.
Overall, positive moods seem to have mixed effects on people’s reasoning. On the
one hand, they seem to promote greater flexibility and creativity in problem solving,
which appears logically desirable; on the other hand, they seem to promote a more
top-down, less data-driven, and less thorough mode of processing, which appears
logically less desirable. (Pham, 2007, p. 158)

So, for example, the environment can have an impact on how we reason, and
even on what beliefs we hold. A nice day replete with sunshine and little birdies
chirping merrily, can influence our mood, and, ergo, our behaviour. “A basic
requirement of logical rationality is an accuracy of perceptions and beliefs. A large
body of evidence indicates that incidental affective states tend to distort people’s
perceptions and beliefs about objects in an assimilative fashion” (Pham, 159). In my
work, I take the sense of the term ‘environment’ very broadly, especially as used in
my visceral mode of communication (Gilbert, 1997). Thus, the setting, power
relations, gender relations, and what might be considered incidental activities or
factors all become potentially relevant to the interaction. We are, in fact, well aware
of this. For that reason we ask for a raise on days off when the boss is in a good
mood, and we don’t bring up the subject of homework when a child is in the midst of
a tantrum. We look upon failure to be aware of such markers and failure to take
them into account as a sign of a lack in either emotional acuity or intelligence.1
There has been considerable debate over the question of whether cognition
I must confess that I am delighted to find that there is empirical evidence for a principle of my
theory and also of Willard’s. We, along with other rhetorically minded Argumentation Theorists, have
been arguing that the idea of context, situation, or environment is integral to understanding
argumentation and, indeed, communication. It is a relief to have some scientific basis for this.
1
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precedes emotion, emotion precedes cognition, or whether there is any separation
between them at all. I want to declare immediately that I am only a spectator in this
debate, and would not know an amygdale if it was served to me with a béarnaise
sauce. Nonetheless, the debate is an interesting one. Elster (1999, p. 2), says, “By and
large, emotions are triggered by beliefs.” I do not have great issues with this, as the
examples I used above illustrate, but I remark it to underline that, for him, there is a
discernible difference between emotions and beliefs. Hume, alternatively, takes a
different view: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Hume, 1985, Bk. II
S. 3). This too, makes sense. The passions, after all, tell us what we like, and reason
tells us how to achieve it. Compare these to the opening quotation, “The concepts of
‘cognition’ and ‘emotion’ are, after all, simply abstractions for two aspects of one
brain in the service of action” (Storbeck & Clore, 2007, p. 1213).
How does the priority of either reason or emotion relate to the question of
control. I have argued that we can lose control via reason or via emotion, and that
attempting to determine which is prior will likely result in our concluding that they
are, except in the most abstract sense, completely intertwined and frequently
indistinguishable. Beliefs can lead to feelings, as when one is taught racist beliefs
when young, and emotions can underscore those same beliefs. On the other hand,
emotion may well lead to a rejection of false or doubtful beliefs as one begins to
become uncomfortable with the way they sit. I have, for example, the strong belief
that people with free earlobes, as opposed to attached earlobes, are more intelligent,
honest, hardworking, reliable, creative, and generally more worthy of reward and
praise. Those with attached lobes tend to the lower classes, are naturally more
adept at menial labour, and are not worthy of serious education. I would , indeed, be
very upset were my daughter to marry one.
Now the question is, are we dealing here with a cognitive issue, a question of
beliefs, facts, and knowledge, or something based in emotion? We know that people
believe the strangest things, and they often feel that their beliefs are correct.
However, as I have argued elsewhere, (Gilbert, 2011), feelings often the form the
basis for many beliefs be they spiritual, scientific or mathematical. Consequently, it
is the mix of both that creates the belief set on which many actions are based, and
pointing to emotion or cognition as the sole operating factor is just mistaken.
3. THE NECESSITY OF EMOTION
A while ago (Gilbert, 2007) I discussed a question raised by Biro and Siegel (1992)
regarding how one makes decisions, and how “rational” that process is. Their
contention is that someone who, using their example, chose a candidate to vote for
based on the candidate’s looks was obviously wrong and not rational. I called this
the BS challenge, and I have given it much thought since that time. I want to say, first
of all, that I truly understand their point. We want citizens to make voting choices
based on such things as the issues and positions of the several candidates, and not
on something we would consider frivolous or irrelevant or emotional. The problem I
have is that the more I think about it, the weaker the BS position is.
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Consider a reasonably intelligent person attempting to decide between
candidates in a provincial election. Her riding has the usual four, Liberal,
Conservative, NDP and Green. Now, on the BS model, she is supposed to carefully
consider the position of each party on… Well, on what? On everything? On each
issue from daycare to small business postal subsidies? What about the attitude each
has toward federal transfer payments as a function of agricultural support? Indeed,
each of the parties has a huge 600 page book detailing all their positions. We must
assume, according to BS, that once the election is called, she must spend all her free
time studying these manifestoes, comparing them, and deciding which party has the
best stand on each issue.
Obviously, our voter, let’s call her Sally, is not and maybe even cannot do this,
certainly not in the time between parliament being prorogued and election day. Not
only that, but we don’t expect her to do that, simply because we don’t do that. No one
who doesn’t have a job requirement to undertake those researches will do it, not
least because no human being really understands federal/provincial transfer
payments, and who wants to? Sally will first and foremost, decide which issues she
cares about. She will then examine the parties on those issues, while perhaps
keeping an open ear on others. Sally being a young woman who is engaged to be
married, is very concerned about daycare, EI maternity benefits, and education. Her
fiancé’s main concerns are job creation programmes and a provincial commitment
to bringing an NFL team to the province. Neither of them cares about the
attractiveness of the candidates or, for that matter, their race, religion or sex, though
Sally would be happier to vote for a woman.
What I want to suggest is that these base decisions, these preferences, are
essentially emotional, and a function of one’s concerns at the time. I very well
remember being an expectant father, and nothing in the world seemed so pressing
to me as the issues that touched upon child birth, childcare, education and so on.
While I still regard them as important, they are not the only ones I take into
consideration. What remains, however, is that it is virtually impossible to consider
all the issues, and even if we could, we would still have to rank them in order of
importance and that, in and of itself, is an emotional process. We always, in short,
reason with choice, preference and feelings already in play. Regard Damasio when
discussing the patient Elliot who had pre-frontal damage meaning that his affective
input was inhibited: “What the experience with patients such as Elliot suggests is
that the cool strategy advocated by Kant, among others, has far more to do with the
way patients with prefrontal damage go about deciding than with how normals
usually operate” (op. cit. 172). I.e., in the ideal, BS, model “reasoning” never stops,
because the decision cannot be made by reasoning alone; emotional input is
required to limit the field of choices. This is the issue I raised in (2011). Emotion or
intuition or feeling is required to avoid infinite regress, simply because we have a
need to have closure over information and options.
4. WOMEN ARE SO EMOTIONAL
There is another aspect to the emotion/cognition debate that needs mentioning.
This concerns the role of gender, and the way in which the genders are expected
5
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(and frequently do) involve themselves with emotion and cognition. If we reflect
back to the question I opened with, why is emotion so scary, we really have to step
back and ask, scary to whom? The cultural mythology is that emotions are scarier to
men than to women, and, according to the research in social psychology that's not
really far off. But we should be more precise: people with certain characteristics
traditionally labelled as feminine tend to be more comfortable with being around and
with expressing emotions than those who lack those characteristics. This is more
precise because it does not divide the world into two neat boxes of “Woman” and
“Man.” Rather, it identifies certain traits or characteristics that are not directly
correlated to either sex or gender. “For example,” Brody writes, “when men engage
in child care, their emotional expressiveness resembles what we stereotypically
associate with women. Men who take primary responsibility for raising their
children express more nurturance, affection, and disclose more feelings than men
who do not” (Brody, 1997, p. 376). Thus, using Spence’s (Spence & Buckner, 2000)
multi-dimensional traits analysis, it is not males but masculinity that abhors
emotion. Of course, femininity is generally found in greater abundance in women
than in men, and as many have argued, that is a function of socialization, power
relations, and social role (Brody, 1997, passim), rather than biological factors.
If we now return to our original question, “why are we so afraid of emotion?”
we need to make an adjustment to the term ‘we.’ Because, it turns out that the ‘we’
does not really include everyone, but, rather it includes predominately those with
masculine characteristics, viz., men, and not only men, but men with minimal
feminine aspects. The result of this is a decided favouristism toward so-called
“rational” procedures, what I have identified as the “logical” mode of communication
(Gilbert, 1997), which results, in turn, in a major Component of what is call The
Patriarchy. The patriarchy works by excluding those who rely on, utilize, respond to,
or otherwise have sympathy for emotional communication and argument. This is
not the sole tool of the patriarchy, but it is a major one. It excludes many, and for
many reasons (Rooney, 2010; Campbell, 1994; Jaggar, 1989). It should also be noted
in passing that it is not only women who are excluded, but numerous cultural
groups as well are silenced by not being able to play the logic game according to
rules they may not even know, let alone understand (Reygadas, 2001).
The process is very simple. Men are conditioned not to show any emotion
other than anger, while women are taught that demonstrating emotion is good.
In Western cultures women are believed to be more emotionally expressive
in general than are men. Specifically, they are expected to smile more as well as to
show more sadness, fear, and guilt. In contrast, men are believed to show more
overt emotional displays only in terms of physically aggressive anger. (Hess et al.,
2000, p. 610)
Of course, expressing emotion is not the same as experiencing emotion. The
gender differences there are much less marked (Kring & Gordon, 1998).
Nonetheless, the insistence on eliminating and isolating emotions precludes those
women who have not trained themselves in at least the show of masculine traits
from being taken seriously (Burrow, 2005). This is sexist and morally unacceptable,
and provides a significant reason for why we need to adjust our criteria for
reasonableness, as well as distinguishing the logical from the rational.
6
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5. CONCLUSION
The problem with modelling things that aren’t separate is that we invariably forget
we’re modelling. That is, we make a distinction for theoretical purposes, describe
the paradigmatic cases we identify in order to attain a deeper understanding of the
concepts, and then promptly forget they are concepts, and treat them like
independent objects. Subsequently, we find ourselves in philosophical difficulties,
and have to prove the two things are not separate, which is what we stipulated in
the first place and then forgot. There are many examples of this including
mind/brain, female/male, public/private, and, par excellence, emotion/reason.
The issue here, and one that has haunted philosophy through the ages,
concerns the reintegrating of emotion and reason, or, to use my language, the rebaptizing of emotional argument and emotional decision-making as rational. I have
argued that the bogeyman is not emotion, but loss of control, and that reason can be
out of control as well. Certainly, we can lose control of our emotions, but that
occurrence invariably involves cognitive considerations. In addition, our reason can
lead us into dreadful situations as a result of beliefs we hold and the consequences
that follow from them. With apologies to Churchill, we might conclude by saying that
we have nothing to fear but ourselves.
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